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1. Introduction 
After years of stagnation in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), China’s financial reform started 
gaining traction in 2012, marked by the widening of the RMB daily trading band (from +/-0.5 percent to +/-1 
percent) and the expansion of interest rate permissible ranges. Among of the reforms announced since Xi 
Jinping came to power, the financial sector seems to have attracted the greatest attention, be it domestic 
financial reform or capital account liberalisation. Embracing of capital account liberalisation looks particularly 
bold for a government still very concerned about maintaining stable financial markets. The extreme reaction to 
the stock market sell-off in summer 2015 says it all in this regard. Such ‘boldness’ can only be explained by 
China’s desire to become a real economic power, which has historically been associated with having an 
international currency. For the RMB to become an international currency, convertibility is obviously needed. The 
real question is how ‘managed’ that convertibility could possibly be for the Chinese government to attain both 
objectives: having a grandiose international currency and relatively stable financial markets.  
At the same time, China has embarked on a massive leveraging. It all started with the public sector and, in 
particular, local governments, which borrowed from banks to invest in infrastructure projects as a way to 
implement a massive stimulus package. Companies followed suit with huge borrowing both at home and 
abroad. By October 2015, neither the state nor corporates had stopped that leveraging process. This paper 
reflects on these two major trends, financial reform – and in particular capital account liberalisation – and 
concurrent leveraging, and draws a number of conclusions for China’s policymakers. The most important is that 
leveraging might actually be a huge hindrance to capital account liberalisation and even (if the course of 
liberalisation is not changed) a major cost for the Chinese economy. In other words, the processes of financial 
reform and leveraging could be seen as two trains running towards one another, which are bound to crash 
unless one of them moves aside. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. First, an overview of the degree of financial liberalisation is offered 
in Section 2. Section 3 looks into the next steps and what may be the consequences for China in terms of capital 
inflows and outflows. Section 4 turns towards the other side of the coin, China’s indebtedness, reviewing the 
main reasons for this. Section 5 evaluates why China’s leveraging process may be a major problem, particularly 
in a context of renewed financial liberalisation efforts. Finally, Section 6 offers possible solutions to the 
potentially crashing trains that may undermine the Chinese economy in its transformation process. 
 
2. How much has China liberalised its financial system and what are the next steps 
After quite a slow start in 2005, when the RMB was expanded – albeit only marginally – and the interest rate 
corridor was partially liberalised, financial reform received another push from 2012 onwards and, even more so, 
since the new administration, led by Xi Jinping, took office in March 2013.  
In fact, in the most important gathering since Xi Jinping came to power, namely the Third Plenum in November 
2013, the Chinese authorities gave clear priority to financial liberalisation along with a few other important areas 
on the blueprint of reforms. In particular, a number of important ‘breakthroughs’ to take place by 2020 were 
announced. This message was understood in terms of interest rate liberalisation, the free float of the RMB and 
full capital account liberalisation by that date. More generally, the objective was to reduce financial repression 
in the following areas:  i) formidable entry barriers for private capital in the banking sector; ii) controlled interest 
rates to protect banks’ profit margins; iii) underdeveloped domestic bond and equity markets; and iv) the 
inflexible exchange rate and the largely closed capital account.  
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With these objectives, the authorities moved in several directions. On the external side, the exchange rate band 
was widened and there was a big push for the RMB to be used as an international currency, not only in more 
jurisdictions but also in many more ways, as we shall explain. On the domestic side, interest rates continued to 
be liberalised and more competition was introduced into the banking sector. 
External financial reform 
China started liberalising a very tightly controlled exchange rate regime in July 2015 when a narrow band of 
fluctuation was announced. The band was widened on a number of special occasions in 2005 (Figure 1 marks 
them all and Table 1 in the Annex has a list of all measures taken towards financial liberalisation). The latest 
ones were in March 2014 (daily trading band expanded to +/-2 percent) and a wider band, +/-3 percent was 
announced by the State Council on 24 July  2015 although it has not yet been implemented. The first move 
marked the People's Bank of China's (PBoC) first intention not to allow a one-way bet on the RMB, which had 
generally been the case before, and introduce more two-way volatility to the currency. In fact, the RMB was 
brought to a sudden depreciation right after scaring many investors at a time at which China was receiving a 
large amount of portfolio inflows (Figure 2). Since then the RMB has been hovering comfortably within the band, 
although closer to its upper limit. Most analysts now, including the International Monetary Fund, consider the 
RMB to be close to ‘fair value’. The most recent decision was probably driven by the PBoC’s eagerness to show 
additional liberalisation steps after the very many interventionist measures to prop up the stock market after its 
collapse. This is especially relevant in China’s race for the RMB to become part of the Special Drawing Rights 
(SDR) basket. 
Figure 1: Major RMB’s liberalisation steps since 2005 
 
Source: Natixis Research. 
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Figure 2: RMB fluctuations within the band both on-shore (CNY) and off-shore (CNH) 
 
Source: Bloomberg. 
In terms of RMB internationalisation, the process has moved clearly faster than exchange rate flexibility. RMB 
trade settlements have ballooned since the pilot programme was introduced in 2009 (Figure 3) and today are 
already 22 percent of total global settlements. One of the landmarks actually took place in mid-2010 with the 
introduction of an off-shore RMB market (CNY) which has been fluctuating relatively close to the CNY as shown 
in Figure 2 but still with arbitrage opportunities. In addition, a large number of swap lines have been agreed with 
a number of countries, thereby boosting RMB settlements around the globe (Table 2 in the Annex). Finally, China 
has opened up to portfolio flows from abroad in a massive way since 2012 although following a special quota 
system, namely the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor Programme (QFII) and RMB Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investor Programme (RQFII), enabling off-shore RMB to be brought back to the Mainland (Figure 4). 
In that vein, an increasing number of central banks around the world are starting to hold some of their reserves 
in RMB, although it remains a very marginal proportion (Table 3 in the Annex). In addition, although foreign direct 
investment (FDI) has been largely open for decades, there is still an approval process as well as restrictions on 
many sectors. Trade credit and offshore borrowing are subject to controls for prudential reasons, but they are 
relatively accessible for many companies. China has also simplified foreign exchange regulations to give 
companies more freedom in dealing with their foreign currency assets. All in all, according to the IMF’s 
classification, 35 out of 40 capital account items are already fully or partly convertible in China, leaving only five 
inconvertible. The biggest remaining restrictions on capital flows today are on foreign currency exchange for 
individuals and outward portfolio investment. The latter was opened in 2006 through a quota system called 
Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor (QDII), although it remains limited compared to the total amount of 
financial holdings in China. Finally, the largest recent liberalisation step was the link between Shanghai and 
Hong Kong stock markets through the Stock Connect in November 2014.  This pilot programme allows investors 
in Hong Kong and Mainland China to trade and settle some of the shares listed on the other market via the 
exchange and clearing house in their home market.  
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Figure 3: RMB trade settlements 
 
Source: PBoC, SAFE, Natixis research 
 
Figure 4: Quotas for RQFII and QFII over time 
 
Source: Dragonomics. 
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Domestic financial reform 
As for external liberalisation, domestic financial reform started in the early 2000s. The lending rate was 
liberalised more rapidly than the deposit rate, which somehow got stuck in that process during the global 
financial crisis.  The new wave of liberalisation measures took place after the Plenum, again in March 2014, as 
with the exchange rate. In this case, five bank licenses were made available to private enterprise applicants, 
inaugurating the long-awaited pilot programme of opening the state-dominated banking sector to private capital. 
It became evident only later that the newcomers would be major internet companies, namely Alibaba and 
Tencent. In addition, the CBRC also relaxed the restrictions for private capital to invest in other non-banking 
financial institutions, such as consumer finance companies and financial leasing companies. At the same time 
the Shanghai Free Trade Zone (FTZ) became the new favourite of the government to catalyse financial reforms. 
This pilot programme was meant to pioneer full interest rate liberalisation, allow cross-border borrowings from 
foreign countries and permit FTZ residents to invest overseas. 
A second important measure was to completely lift the lending rate floor in June 2014, while keeping intact the 
cap on deposit rates (10 percent above official benchmark deposit rates, Figure 5). However, the lifting of the 
lending rate was done at time when it was not really binding, so it did not have a big macroeconomic impact. 
Other measures taken in the interest rate liberalisation sphere were to allow banks to issue CDs in the interbank 
market and set up the prime rate mechanism to encourage banks to establish a market-based1 benchmark 
lending rate. These coordinating measures also helped lay a solid institutional foundation for the authorities to 
start freeing up deposit rates later. In that context, a formal deposit guarantee was introduced in November 
2014, in line with the general perception that a deposit insurance scheme is a necessary precondition for the 
full liberalisation of deposit rates to avoid moral hazard. Finally, the ceiling on the deposit rate was finally lifted 
on 23 October 2015, which should have very important consequences in terms of stiffening competition for 
funds among Chinese banks and reducing the relatively large net interest margin that Chinese banks have been 
enjoying for decades.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1Today every Chinese individual is allowed to buy no more than US$50,000 worth of foreign currency from 
banks each year.  
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Figure 5: Evolution of interest rates and liberalisation measures 
 
Source: Bloomberg and BBVA Research. 
  
3. Next steps in financial liberalisation: What to expect? 
 
Notwithstanding how surprising it may be that a stability-obsessed government like China's pushes for capital 
account convertibility, the reality is that the project is up and running. There are two important points to 
remember. The first is that the capital account is already quite opened de facto. The second is that the 
government is probably not planning to completely open up cross-border capital flows. In fact, ‘managed 
convertibility’ might actually be the target. In other words, there is no question that China’s capital account will 
become more open than it is today, but the change is one of degree not of kind. In fact, South Korea and Taiwan 
also used the QFII/QDII model in the early stages of their financial opening and gradually lifted them. 
Once China liberalises the capital account to a degree similar to most Asian economies, the key question is what 
will happen to its gross capital inflows and outflows. He et al (2012) analyse that question empirically and 
conclude that China’s gross international investment positions would grow significantly, and inflows and 
outflows would become much more balanced. The private sector would turn its net liability position into a 
balanced position, and the official sector would reduce its net asset position significantly, relative to the 
country’s GDP. This basically means that outward FDI will continue to grow substantially over the years. He et al 
also conclude that China would continue to be a net creditor, with the net foreign asset position as a share of 
GDP remaining largely stable through this decade. The implication of this picture for the RMB is that of stability, 
which is in line with the idea that the RMB today is close to fair value. 
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4. The other side of the coin: China’s leveraging 
 
China’s financial liberalisation has come hand in hand with a process of continuous leveraging, especially since 
the global financial crisis. This section analyses the reasons behind this, how big the problem is, and for whom. 
Over-borrowing by the public and corporate sectors can be traced by the huge stimulus package and lax 
monetary policy which Chinese economic authorities introduced during the global financial crisis of 2008-09. In 
fact, a massive stimulus package was unveiled to counteract the adverse impact of the crisis on the domestic 
economy. The stimulus package consisted of three key components. First, the authorities substantially 
loosened monetary policy with interest rate cuts, reductions in reserve requirements and even very aggressive 
credit targets for banks. Second, a tremendous investment plan was deployed, with the main focus on 
infrastructure. The plan was estimated to be RMB 4 trillion when announced, but ended up being much bigger. 
Finally, the government subsidised the development of several important industries and lowered mortgage 
rates to boost housing demand.  
According to the authorities’ initial plan, funds needed for the stimulus package would come from three sources: 
central government, local governments and banks, with each accounting for about one-third. However, in 
practice, given their limited fiscal capacity, local governments had to turn to banks to meet their borrowing 
needs. To circumvent the legal prohibition on direct borrowing by local governments from banks, local 
governments established special purposed vehicles (called ‘Local Government Financing Vehicles’ or LGFVs) to 
obtain bank loans. Banks, on their side, could not decline loan requests from either central or local government 
because the majority of banks are in essence owned and controlled by governments. In the meantime, the 
government’s subsidies for specific industries boosted credit demand as firms in these sectors sought to take 
advantage of policy support and expand their production capacity. 
As a consequence, the stimulus measures implemented during the global financial crisis led to a huge lending 
binge with Chinese banks splashing out a record-high RMB 9.6 trillion of new loans in 2009, compared to a mere 
4.2 trillion in 2008. Accordingly, the aggregate bank loans registered a record growth of 31.7 percent in 2009 
and 19.9 percent in 2010 on a year-on-year basis, substantially higher than the average loans growth rate of 15 
percent during the period 1998-2008.  
Stimulus packages have since become the new norm of China’s economic policy. When growth slowed down 
again in 2012 and 2013, the authorities responded by rolling out more infrastructure projects to revive the 
economy. Meanwhile, corporate borrowers felt they could leverage on the basis of this new norm. Given that 
banks’ balance sheets were not enough to accommodate the borrowing from both public and private sectors, a 
good part of the corporate sector, especially the smaller corporate, has increasingly used the shadow banking 
sector to meet its financing needs and circumvent tightening regulations on bank loan issuance. As such, both 
public and corporate debt have snowballed during the last few years. 
The banking sector is still the biggest lender in China. However, the shadow banking sector has become an 
important source of funding, accounting for more than one-quarter of total outstanding debt (Figure 6).  
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Figure 6:  Shadow banking has become an important sources 
 
Source: CEIC and BBVA Research. 
There is a lack of official data on China’s total public debt. The latest, most comprehensive official data comes 
from a report by National Audit Office, released at end-2013. At that time, the debt level of the central 
government was 21.8 percent of GDP, which included both the general fiscal debt of the central government 
(16.7 percent of GDP) and the debt of the national railway company (5.1 percent of GDP). Meanwhile, total local 
government debt (excluding debt of state-owned enterprises and contingent pension debt, which are not 
covered in the NAO report) amounted to 31.5 percent of GDP. Total public debt was thus hovering around 53 
percent of GDP. Interestingly, more recent private sources have relatively similar estimates of public debt (55 
percent of GDP according to McKinsey, 2015) (Figure 7). Even if the stock of public debt might look relatively 
contained, especially when compared to developed economies, some characteristics of local government debt 
ring alarm bells (Garcia Herrero et al, 2014). First, maturity mismatches are present, especially for LGFVs, which 
use short-term borrowing to finance long-term infrastructure projects. Second,  interest rates of local 
government debt (6-8 percent) are well above the average interest rate paid by the central government (4-5 
percent) and the benchmark lending rate (6 percent).   
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Figure 7: Evolution of China’s debt by component 
 
Source: McKinsey. 
 
Figure 8: Total debt in selected Asian countries 
 
Source: DataStream, CEIC and McKinsey. 
 
Debt-to-GDP ratio (%) 
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Beyond public debt, corporates have been leveraging much faster. In fact, as much as 52 percentage points of 
GDP was added to the stock of private debt between 2007 and 2014. This, together with some additional 
although still limited leveraging from households, puts  China’s total debt at a level close to 300 percent of GDP, 
the largest in Asia after Japan (see Figures 7 and 8). Beyond the stock of private debt, debt service is becoming 
an issue. According to Garcia Herrero et al (2013), corporate indebtedness has been at stress levels for several 
years, and has been rising fast (Figure 9). In particular, as of end-2014, more than one quarter of the companies 
in our sample of domestically-listed firms had a ratio of EBITDA to interest expenses of less than one, implying 
that their operating cash flow was insufficient to service their interest payments. This, of course, does not bode 
well for the health of the corporate sector in China. In this context, we cannot forget that further financial reform 
would probably push the cost of funding up as part of domestic savings will be invested abroad for 
diversification reasons. There could thus be a trade-off between financial reform and financial stability, which 
will make it even tougher for the Chinese authorities to push reform further. The negative impact of financial 
reform on corporate funding is also behind a good part of the opposition to reform from corporate China, in 
particular the large SOEs. 
Figure 9: Corporate debt stress ratios  
 
Source: Wind, CEIC and BBVA Research. Note: Stress ratios calculated for Chinese listed companies. 
Finally, it is important to note that most of this pile of debt is in the hands of residents, which many argue is a 
good enough reason not to worry about China’s leveraging. I would argue that there are three main reasons why 
we should worry about China’s debt problem. First, local government debt will need to be cleaned up at some 
point, which will undermine banks’ asset quality (unless the current loan for debt swap programme is enlarged 
to all of the bank loans extended to local governments, but we are still far from that). Second, as Elmendorf and 
Mankiw (1999) argue, a heavy debt burden – even if moved to the central government – could weigh on the 
growth rate both in the short and on the long term. Third, both domestic and external liberalisation will increase 
funding costs for the government, and corporates and savers will become free to choose from other investment 
opportunities.  
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How to push for financial reform while piling up debt 
 
The history of financial reform is plagued with crises as a natural consequences of investors’ behaviour once 
they are freed from tight controls. There are two well-known cases for which this is especially true: weak 
regulation, and excessive leverage. We do not judge the former here, although it would be easy to make that 
argument at least for shadow banking (being virtually unregulated). For the latter, the previous section shows 
enough evidence of the risks ahead.  The issue can be summarised as follows. China’s debt problem is 
associated with several rounds of stimulus that aimed to counter the negative shocks from global financial 
crisis. The stimulus packages have led to over-investment in infrastructure by local governments, and the build-
up of excess production capacity in a number of industries. On the positive side, all the investment in China is 
mainly financed by domestic savings, given China’s persistent surpluses under the current account. This should 
give some relief to investors worrying about an imminent crash in China. On the flip side, it also indicates that 
there exist deep-rooted institutional flaws in China’s economy (such as a variety of financial repression), which 
have channelled high national savings into less-efficient investment (wasteful infrastructure investment and 
the build-up of over-capacity). Opening up the current account will allow investors to better allocate their 
savings, but it will also be harder for the Chinese authorities and corporates to find cheap funding because 
currently repressed savings can move elsewhere. This really means that leverage would need to be tamed – 
and if possible reduced – before the capital account is opened.  
To that end, a number of key structural reforms are needed. In particular, fiscal reform is clearly a must to 
improve central government control over local governments and other sources of the now extremely large 
consolidated fiscal deficit in China. Local governments should be entitled to more tax revenues, commensurate 
with their social spending obligations. The authorities are also seeking to reduce the weight of provincial GDP in 
the performance appraisal system of local government officials, which would help reduce their incentive to 
engage in wasteful infrastructure projects. Finally, local governments are increasingly being allowed to directly 
issue long-term municipal bonds to replace their existing borrowing from banks. Given the central government 
backing, this at least is a recognition of a public debt that before was hard to account for. In any event, to reduce 
the stock problem, local governments have substantial assets they could sell, including their participation in 
state-owned enterprises. Regarding the corporate debt problem, the authorities should also increase their 
regulatory efforts to effectively curb shadow banking activities and prevent a further build-up of the corporate 
debt level. Finally, the current situation in which the system is flooded with liquidity to avoid raising interest 
rates is clearly not the best way to curb leverage.  
In conclusion, although financial reform is being pushed at a difficult time, given China’s massive leverage, it 
does seem important to keep pushing. Otherwise, the leveraging process will continue to keep interest rates 
artificially low, and savings will continue to be allocated inefficiently. Finally, the internationalisation of the RMB 
cannot but help the Chinese government and Chinese corporates to fund themselves in the international 
markets without having to rely on the US dollar. 
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Annex 
 
Table 1: Selected steps in financial liberalisation 
Reform Date  Key Points 
CNH market was born July-August 2010  Offshore RMB officially becomes deliverable in HK and RMB clearing bank established. 
Dim-sum bonds  August  2011  Corporates in China allowed to issue dim-sum bonds. 
RQFII programme kick-started December 2011  Foreigners allowed to use offshore RMB for onshore investments. 
Wenzhou Financial 
Liberalisation 
March  
2012  
Allow private lenders in the city to operate as investment companies with the goal of increasing small 
and medium enterprise (SME) finance. Wenzhou residents are allowed to invest in non-financial 
companies overseas. 
Exchange Rate  
Band Widening 
April  
2012  
The daily band for the renminbi /US dollar exchange rate increased from +/-0.5% to +/-1% around the fix 
daily rate set by the PBoC. 
Enlargement of  
QFII Quota 
April  
2012  Increased the quotas for qualified foreign institutional investors to $80 billion from $30 billion. 
Over-the-Counter  
(OTC) Market 
April  
2012  
Creation of a new OTC market primarily consisted of SMEs, which is aimed to broaden the finance 
channels for SMEs, especially high-tech companies. 
Qianhai Pilot Programme June  2012  
Companies in Qianhai will be encouraged to sell renminbi bonds in Hong Kong and to experiment with 
cross- border loans in the Chinese currency. 
SME Bond Market June  2012  Creation of a high-yield (aka junk bond) market for SMEs through private placement. 
Interest Rate Benchmark  
Band Widening June/July 2012  
Allows 10% of premium for deposit rates and 30% discount for lending rates.  
 
Enlargement of  
RMB-QFII Quota November 2012  
Increased the quotas for RMB qualified foreign institutional investors to RMB 270 billion from RMB 70 
billion.  
Pilot scheme for RMB sweeping November 2012  Scheme for cross-border inter-company RMB loans dished out. 
More access to the  
QFII investors  
March 
 2013  
Qualified QFII institutions are allowed to investment in the inter-bank bond market. Previously, QFII 
investors were only allowed to invest in the A-share market and bonds listed in the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen exchanges. 
Guidelines for the program of  
RMB Qualified  
Foreign Institutional Investors 
(RQFII) 
May  
2013  
Designated foreign institutional investors (mainly including banks, insurances companies, pension, 
and other financial institutions) are allowed to repatriate offshore RMB to the Mainland for investment 
use. 
Introduction of CNH Hibor fixing June  2013  Treasury Markets Association unveils launch of CNH Hibor fixing. 
Removal of lending  
rate floor 
July  
2013  
Removed: (i) the lending rate floor on bank loans (before set at 70% of the benchmark lending rate); (ii) 
controls on the price setting of banks’ bill discounting; and (iii) lending rate caps (previously set at 2.3x 
the benchmark lending rate) on rural credit unions 
Expansion of a pilot programme 
of consumer finance 
companies 
September 
2013  
The pilot program will be expanded from previous 4 cities to 16 cities. Before, the CBRC will only 
approve one consumer finance company for every eligible city and strictly prohibit their cross-city 
operation.   
Launch of Shanghai Free Trade 
Zone 
September 
2013  
The government officially launched the Shanghai Free Trade Zone. In addition to the promised 
implementation of trade and investment liberalising measures, the Zone has attracted market attention 
for its plans to become a test ground for the liberalisation of interest rates and capital account opening. 
Creation of New Prime Lending 
Rate October 2013  
The new prime lending rate will be calculated daily as a weighted average of nine banks’ actual lending 
rates, and is meant to assist banks in pricing their loans. 
Issuance of the CDs in the 
interbank market 
December 
2013  
Issuance of the new CDs (ranging from one-month to three years) is open to commercial and policy 
banks, while purchase is open to both banks and non-bank financial institutions. Interest rates on the 
CDs are to be market-determined, with the Shibor to serve as a benchmark. 
Greater private entry into the 
banking sector 
March  
2014  
China Banking Regulatory Commission issued bank licenses to five banks owned by private capital in a 
pilot program, marking the opening the country's banking sector to private investors. 
Exchange Rate  
Band Widening, Part Ⅱ 
March  
2014  Daily trading band for USD-CNY widened to +/-2%. 
Cross-border stock investment 
between Shanghai and Hong 
Kong 
April  
2014  
The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) announced a pilot programme to allow cross-
border stock investment between Shanghai and Hong Kong stock exchanges. 
Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock 
Connect November 2014  Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect launched. 
Source: Regulators’ websites, BBVA Research and HSBC Global Research. 
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Table 2: China’s RMB BSAs with Other Countries 
Country/Economy Amount Effective Date Expiration Date 
China-Korea 
180 bn RMB/38 Tr Won Dec-08 Dec-11 
renewed and expanded 
360 bn RMB/64 Tr Won Oct-11 Oct-14 
China-Hong Kong 
200 bn RMB/227 bn HKD Jan-09 Jan-12 
renewed and expanded 
400 bn RMB/490 bn HKD Nov-11 Nov-14 
China-Malaysia 
80 bn RMB/40 bn MYR Feb-09 Feb-12 
renewed and expanded 
180 bn RMB/90 bn MYR Feb-12 Feb-15 
China-Belarus  
20 bn RMB/8 tr BYB Mar-09 Mar-12 
China-Indonesia 
100 bn RMB/ 175 tr Rupiah Mar-09 Mar-12 
renewed 
100 bn RMB/ 175 tr Rupiah Oct-13 Oct-16 
China-Argentina 
70 bn RMB/ Equal Amount Peso Mar-09 Mar-12 
China-Iceland 
3.5 bn RMB/66 bn ISK Jun-10 Jun-13 
renewed 
3.5 bn RMB/66 bn ISK Sep-13 Sep-16 
China-Singapore 
150 bn RMB/30 bn SGD Jul-10 Jul-13 
renewed 
300 bn RMB/60 bn SGD Mar-13 Mar-16 
China-New Zealand 
25 bn RMB Apr-11 Apr-14 
China-Uzbekistan 
0.7 bn RMB Apr-11 Apr-14 
China-Mongolia 
5 bn RMB May-11 May-14 
renewed and expanded 
10 bn RMB Mar-12 May-14 
China-Kazakhstan 
7 bn RMB Jun-11 Jun-14 
China-Thailand 
70 bn RMB/ 320 bn THB Dec-11 Dec-14 
China-Pakistan 
10 bn RMB/140 bn PKR Dec-11 Dec-14 
China-UAE 
35 bn RMB/20 bn AED Jan-12 Jan-15 
China-Turkey 
10 bn RMB/3 bn TRY Feb-12 Feb-15 
China-Australia 
200 bn RMB/30 bn AUD Mar-12 Mar-15 
China-Ukraine 
15 bn RMB/19 bn UAH Jun-12 Jun-15 
China-Brazil 
190 bn RMB/60 bn BRL Mar-13 Mar-16 
China-UK 
200 bn RMB/20 bn GBP Jun-13 Jun-16 
China-Hungary 
10 bn RMB/375 bn HUF Sep-13 Sep-16 
China-Albania 
2 bn RMB/3.58 bn ALL Sep-13 Sep-16 
China-ECB 
350 bn RMB/45 bn EUR Oct-13 Oct-16 
China-Switzerland 
150 bn RMB/21 bn Sfr July-14 July-17 
China-Qatar 
35 bn RMB/20.8 bn QAR Nov-14 Nov-17 
China-Canada 
200 bn RMB/30 bn CAD Nov-14 Nov-17 
China-Chile 
22 bn RMB/ 2.2 tr CLP May-15 May-18 
 
Source: BBVA Research, Natixis Research. 
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Table 3: Countries were RMB is used a reserve currency 
Announcement Date Country/Economy % of RMB Assets in Foreign Reserve 
2010 Sep Malaysia N.A. 
2011 May South Korea N.A. 
2011 Sep Chile 0.30% 
2011 Sep Venezuela N.A. 
2011 Nov Thailand <1% 
2012 Mar Japan N.A. 
2012 Jul Indonesia N.A. 
2013 Apr Australia 5% 
2013 Aug Belarus N.A. 
2013 Oct Taiwan N.A. 
2013 Oct Taiwan N.A. 
2013 Nov South Africa 3% 
2014 Jan Nigeria 7% 
2014 Mar Colombia N.A. 
2014 Oct UK N.A. 
Source: BBVA Research 
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